Intergenerational policies, public debt, and economic growth: A politico-economic analysis
Real Arai (),
Katsuyuki Naito and
Tetsuo Ono ()
Journal of Public Economics, 2018, vol. 166, issue C, 39-52
This study presents a two-period overlapping-generations model with endogenous growth. In each period, the government representing young and old generations provides a public good financed by labor income taxation and public debt issuance, and the government's policies are determined by probabilistic voting. Increased political power of the old lowers economic growth. A debt-ceiling rule is considered to resolve the negative growth effect, but it creates a trade-off between generations in terms of welfare.
Keywords: Public debt; Probabilistic voting; Markov perfect equilibrium; Economic growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H41 H63 O43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Intergenerational policies, public debt, and economic growth: a politico-economic analysis (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:166:y:2018:i:c:p:39-52
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