Giving once, giving twice: A two-period field experiment on intertemporal crowding in charitable giving
Maja Adena and
Steffen Huck
Journal of Public Economics, 2019, vol. 172, issue C, 127-134
Abstract:
We study intertemporal crowding between two fundraising campaigns for the same charitable organization by manipulating donors' beliefs about the likelihood of future campaigns in two subsequent field experiments. The data shows that initial giving is decreasing in the likelihood of a future campaign while subsequent giving increases in initial giving. While this refutes the predictions of a simple expected utility model, the pattern is in line with a model that allows for (anticipated or unanticipated) habit formation provided that donations in the two periods are substitutes.
Keywords: Charitable giving; Field experiments; Intertemporal crowding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D12 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Giving Once, Giving Twice: A Two-Period Field Experiment On Intertemporal Crowding in Charitable Giving (2018)
Working Paper: Giving once, giving twice: A two-period field experiment on inter-temporal crowding in charitable giving (2018)
Working Paper: Giving once, giving twice: A two-period field experiment on intertemporal crowding in charitable giving (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:172:y:2019:i:c:p:127-134
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.01.002
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