Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections

Antony Millner, Hélène Ollivier and Leo Simon

Journal of Public Economics, 2020, vol. 185, issue C

Abstract: How do voters' behavioural biases affect political outcomes? We study this question in a model of Downsian electoral competition in which candidates have private information about the benefits of policies, and voters may infer candidates' information from their electoral platforms. If voters are Bayesian, candidates ‘anti-pander’ – they choose platforms that are more extreme than is justified by their private beliefs. However, anti-pandering is ameliorated if voters' inferences are subject to confirmation bias. Voter confirmation bias causes elections to aggregate candidates' information better, and all observers, whether biased or Bayesian, would like the voters in our model to exhibit more confirmation bias than they do themselves.

Keywords: Confirmation bias; Electoral competition; Pandering; Signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections (2020)
Working Paper: Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections (2020)
Working Paper: Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections (2017)
Working Paper: Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:185:y:2020:i:c:s0047272720300396

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104175

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