Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections

Antony Millner (), Hélène Ollivier and Leo Simon ()
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Antony Millner: UC Santa Barbara - University of California [Santa Barbara] - UC - University of California
Leo Simon: LBNL - Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory [Berkeley], Monash University [Melbourne]

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Abstract: How do voters' behavioural biases affect political outcomes? We study this question in a model of Downsian electoral competition in which candidates have private information about the benefits of policies, and voters may infer candidates' information from their electoral platforms. If voters are Bayesian, candidates ‘anti-pander' – they choose platforms that are more extreme than is justified by their private beliefs. However, anti-pandering is ameliorated if voters' inferences are subject to confirmation bias. Voter confirmation bias causes elections to aggregate candidates' information better, and all observers, whether biased or Bayesian, would like the voters in our model to exhibit more confirmation bias than they do themselves.

Keywords: Confirmation bias; Electoral competition; Pandering; Signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Public Economics, 2020, 185, ⟨10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104175⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections (2020)
Working Paper: Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections (2020)
Working Paper: Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections (2017)
Working Paper: Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02875069

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104175

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