EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Can beneficiary information improve hospital accountability? Experimental evidence from a public health insurance scheme in India

Pascaline Dupas and Radhika Jain

Journal of Public Economics, 2023, vol. 220, issue C

Abstract: We study the role of hospital compliance in the effectiveness of government health insurance in India. Using patient surveys, we document that participating hospitals charge unauthorized fees to poor patients eligible to receive free care. Average out-of-pocket payments (OOPP) for chronic kidney care patients are $43 per month, or 25% annual GDP per capita, and are high at both public and private hospitals. Awareness of program benefits is low despite patients having used insurance for several months. We conduct a randomized experiment to test whether phone-based information about program benefits can enable insurance beneficiaries to hold hospitals accountable and lower OOPP. The intervention effectively increases program awareness by 0.17 standard deviations but has no effect on OOPP overall. However, effects differ dramatically by hospital sector: patients at private hospital see no change in OOPP despite increased bargaining and search; monthly OOPP among patients visiting public hospitals, who are poorer and lower caste, drop by $12 (35%), because they are able to negotiate to get more of their benefits at the hospital instead of paying for them off-site. The findings suggest that patient-driven accountability can meaningfully improve public service delivery, even in the context of specialized tertiary care, but may not substitute for top-down monitoring of private agents.

Keywords: Service delivery; Compliance; Out-of-pocket payments; Voice; Rajasthan (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 I13 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272723000233
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:220:y:2023:i:c:s0047272723000233

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104841

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economics is currently edited by R. Boadway and J. Poterba

More articles in Journal of Public Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-23
Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:220:y:2023:i:c:s0047272723000233