Immigration policy with partisan parties

Humberto Llavador and Angel Solano-García
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Angel Solano Garcia ()

Journal of Public Economics, 2011, vol. 95, issue 1, 134-142

Abstract: This paper analyzes the political economy of immigration when the salient electoral issue is the level of immigrants and the relevant immigration policy is the expenditure in immigration control. We consider that immigration affects voters' welfare through economic and non-economic factors. We model political competition à la Wittman with the ideology of parties endogenously determined at equilibrium. At equilibrium, parties propose different levels of immigration, located to the left and to the right of the median voter's ideal point, and combine skilled and unskilled workers among their constituencies. Numerical simulations provide the levels of immigration proposed by the two parties and the composition of parties' constituencies as we vary the efficacy of immigration control and the intensity of immigration aversion.

Keywords: Immigration; Ideological parties; Unskilled and skilled labor (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F22 J61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272710001283
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Immigration Policy with Partisan Parties (2015)
Journal Article: Immigration policy with partisan parties (2011)
Working Paper: Immigration policy with partisan parties (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:1:p:134-142

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.09.011

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economics is currently edited by R. Boadway and J. Poterba

More articles in Journal of Public Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().