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Immigration Policy with Partisan Parties

Angel Solano-García and Humberto Llavador
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Angel Solano Garcia ()

No 499, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the political economy of immigration when the salient electoral issue is the level of immigrants and the relevant immigration policy is the expenditure in immigration control. We consider that immigration affects voters' welfare through economic and non economic factors. We model political competition à la Wittman with the ideology of parties endogenously determined at equilibrium. At equilibrium, parties propose different levels of immigration, located to the left and to the right of the median voter's ideal point, and combine skilled and unskilled workers among their constituencies. Numerical simulations provide the levels of immigration proposed by the two parties and the composition of parties' constituencies as we vary the efficacy of immigration control and the intensity of immigration aversion.

Keywords: immigration; ideological parties; unskilled and skilled labor (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F22 J61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: Immigration policy with partisan parties (2011) Downloads
Journal Article: Immigration policy with partisan parties (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Immigration policy with partisan parties (2010) Downloads
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