Thanks for nothing? Not-for-profits and motivated agents
Maitreesh Ghatak () and
Journal of Public Economics, 2011, vol. 95, issue 1, 94-105
We re-examine the labor donation theory of not-for-profits and show that these organizations may exist not necessarily because motivated workers prefer to work in them, or that they dominate for-profits in terms of welfare, but because the excess supply of motivated workers makes the non-profit form more attractive to managers. We show that if firms had to compete for motivated workers then not-for-profit firms would be competed out by for-profit firms. Therefore, in the choice between not-for-profit and for-profit provision, other than incentive problems, the distribution of rents between management and workers, and consequently, the relative scarcity of motivated workers may play an important role.
Keywords: Not-for-profits; Intrinsic motivation; Labor donation; Free-riding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L31 J32 L33 J42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Thanks for nothing? Not-for-profits and motivated agents (2011)
Working Paper: Thanks for Nothing? Not-for-Profits and Motivated Agents (2010)
Working Paper: Thanks for Nothing? Not-for-Profits and Motivated Agents (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:1:p:94-105
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