EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Thanks for Nothing? Not-for-Profits and Motivated Agents

Maitreesh Ghatak () and Hannes Mueller

STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: We re-examine the labor donation theory of not-for-profits and show that these organizations may exist not necessarily because motivated workers prefer to work in them, or that they dominate for-profits in terms of welfare, but because the excess supply of motivated workers makes the non-profit form more attractive to managers. We show that if firms had to compete for motivated workers then not-for-profit firms would be competed out by for-profit firms. Therefore, the choice between not-for-profit and for-profit provision is not always a question of resolving incentive problems but also one of distribution of rents between management and workers, and consequently, the relative scarcity of workers plays an important role in this choice.

Keywords: not-for-profits; intrinsic motivation; labor donation; free riding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L31 J32 L33 J42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/eopp/eopp14.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Thanks for nothing? Not-for-profits and motivated agents (2011) Downloads
Journal Article: Thanks for nothing? Not-for-profits and motivated agents (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Thanks for Nothing? Not-for-Profits and Motivated Agents (2010) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stieop:014

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2019-10-13
Handle: RePEc:cep:stieop:014