Playing with the good guys. A public good game with endogenous group formation

Kjell Arne Brekke, Karen Hauge, Jo Lind and Karine Nyborg

Journal of Public Economics, 2011, vol. 95, issue 9, 1111-1118

Abstract: Are some individuals generally more pro-social than others? If so, socially beneficial commitments could serve as a costly screening device helping the pro-social to match. We present a public good game experiment in which subjects choose between two group types: in blue groups, subjects receive a fixed extra payoff; in red groups, this extra payoff is donated, instead, to the Red Cross. A substantial share of our subjects chose red groups. Contributions in red groups were initially higher and stayed high, while contributions in blue groups displayed the well-known declining pattern.

Keywords: Altruism; Conditional cooperation; Self-selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D12 D64 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (60)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Playing with the good guys. A public good game with endogenous group formation (2011)
Working Paper: Playing with the Good Guys - A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation (2009)
Working Paper: Playing with the Good Guys: A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:9:p:1111-1118

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.003

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