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The private provision of excludable public goods: An inefficiency result

Tore Ellingsen () and Elena Paltseva ()

Journal of Public Economics, 2012, vol. 96, issue 9-10, 658-669

Abstract: Does voluntary contracting suffice for the efficient provision of excludable public goods? Even in a complete information environment, we find that the answer is negative. The reason is that some agents may profit from not participating at the provision stage, but instead negotiate access ex post.

Keywords: Contracting; Externalities; Club goods; Free-riding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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