Impure altruism in dictators' giving

Oleg Korenok, Edward L. Millner and Laura Razzolini ()

Journal of Public Economics, 2013, vol. 97, issue C, 1-8

Abstract: We design an experiment to test whether incomplete crowding out in dictator games can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic preferences. By giving the recipients an endowment of varying levels, we create an environment in which crowding out may occur. We find that the behavior of 66% of the dictators can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic utility function.

Keywords: Dictator game; Impure altruism; Incomplete crowding out (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D01 D64 H30 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:97:y:2013:i:c:p:1-8

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.006

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