Impure Altruism in Dictators’ Giving

Oleg Korenok, Edward Millner () and Laura Razzolini ()
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Edward Millner: Department of Economics, VCU School of Business

No 1002, Working Papers from VCU School of Business, Department of Economics

Abstract: We design an experiment to test whether the behavior of dictators can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic utility function. By giving the recipients an endowment of varying levels, we create an environment that allows for observable differences in behavior depending upon whether pure or impure altruism is the primary motivation. We find that the behavior of 66 percent of the dictators can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic utility function, while only 40 percent of the dictators make choices that are consistent with the purely altruistic utility function.

Keywords: Dictator Game; Impure Altruism; Incomplete Crowding Out (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D01 D64 H30 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2010-04, Revised 2011-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.people.vcu.edu/~okorenok/repec_files/MIC.pdf Revision (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Impure altruism in dictators' giving (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vcu:wpaper:1002

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