On the comparison of price and quantity competition under endogenous timing

Xiao-hua Yang, Yun-feng Luo and Hui-qiu Wu

Research in Economics, 2009, vol. 63, issue 1, 55-61

Abstract: This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with linear demand, and asymmetric constant marginal cost under endogenous timing. It shows that endogenous timing leads to two sequential play with both leader-follower configurations in Bertrand, but simultaneous play in Cournot. Moreover, every firm's mark-up/output ratio and the two firms' weighted 'average' price are all lower, but the two firms' weighted 'average' output is higher in either of the two sequential Bertrand equilibria than in the simultaneous-move Cournot equilibrium.

Keywords: Bertrand; Cournot; Endogenous; timing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:63:y:2009:i:1:p:55-61

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