Fixed versus variable supply in the public provision of goods

Raluca Elena Buia

Research in Economics, 2009, vol. 63, issue 3, 160-164

Abstract: Using discriminatory price auctions with variable supply, we explore a situation in which a corruptible public employee is in charge of producing and allocating a finite number of goods among consumers with uniformly distributed valuations. The negative effects of corruption are lower when the employee's task is to "provide at least q0 goods" than when the employee is required to "provide exactly q0 goods".

Keywords: Corruption; Bribing; Discriminatory; price; auctions; Variable; supply (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:63:y:2009:i:3:p:160-164

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