Good research and bad teaching? A business school tale

Damien Besancenot and Joao Faria

Research in Economics, 2010, vol. 64, issue 2, 67-72

Abstract: The paper presents a simultaneous differential game between rich and poor Business Schools (BS) that yields an equilibrium in which either type of BS may end up with bad teaching and good research, without resorting to informational problems. The necessary condition for this is that the BS's impatience is smaller than the growth rate of research, which may arise as a result of the school's lack of vision and ambition in becoming a leading school, or due to the fact that after a given critical mass of human capital is achieved in a BS, research grows fast, making BS managers underuse the available human capital for teaching. Policy implications are discussed.

Keywords: Education; and; teaching; Research; policy; Business; schools (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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