Health insurance: Medical treatment vs disability payment
Geir Asheim,
Anne Wenche Emblem and
Tore Nilssen ()
Research in Economics, 2010, vol. 64, issue 3, 137-145
Abstract:
We present arguments for treating health insurance and disability insurance in an integrated manner in economic analysis, based on a model where each individual's utility depends on both consumption and health and her income depends on her earning ability. When purchasing insurance, she may choose a contract that offers less than full medical treatment. We find that high-ability individuals demand full recovery and equalize utility across states, while low-ability individuals demand partial treatment and cash compensation and suffer a loss in utility if ill. Our results carry over to the case where health states are not observable.
Keywords: Health; insurance; Health; demand; Disability; insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:64:y:2010:i:3:p:137-145
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