Cartel sustainability with vertical product differentiation: Price versus quantity competition

Joaquin Andaluz

Research in Economics, 2010, vol. 64, issue 4, 201-211

Abstract: In the context of a vertically differentiated duopoly, we analyse the influence of the degree of differentiation on cartel sustainability, under both price and quantity competition. We find that, under both Bertrand and Cournot competition, the effect of vertical product differentiation on sustainability of the collusive equilibrium is unclear. It is shown that, given a degree of differentiation, price collusion is more sustainable than quantity collusion.

Keywords: Cartel; sustainability; Vertical; differentiation; Price; versus; quantity; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090-9443(10)00033-5
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:64:y:2010:i:4:p:201-211

Access Statistics for this article

Research in Economics is currently edited by Federico Etro

More articles in Research in Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().