On the rationale of spatial discrimination with quantity-setting firms

Stefano Colombo ()

Research in Economics, 2011, vol. 65, issue 3, 254-258

Abstract: We show in a game-theoretic model that when quantity-setting firms first choose whether to discriminate or not and then set quantities, the unique equilibrium consists in all firms selling a uniform quantity to all consumers. This sharply contrasts with the case of price-setting firms.

Keywords: Cournot; Spatial; discrimination; Hotelling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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