On the rationale of spatial discrimination with quantity-setting firms
Stefano Colombo ()
Research in Economics, 2011, vol. 65, issue 3, 254-258
We show in a game-theoretic model that when quantity-setting firms first choose whether to discriminate or not and then set quantities, the unique equilibrium consists in all firms selling a uniform quantity to all consumers. This sharply contrasts with the case of price-setting firms.
Keywords: Cournot; Spatial; discrimination; Hotelling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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