An indifference result concerning collusion in spatial frameworks
Stefano Colombo ()
Research in Economics, 2012, vol. 66, issue 1, 18-21
Using a general spatial model with two firms interacting repeatedly, we show that the condition for collusion sustainability is the same under uniform delivered pricing, discriminatory delivered pricing and discriminatory f.o.b. pricing.
Keywords: Collusion; Spatial framework (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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