International tax arbitrage and residence vs. source-based capital income taxation

Frank Strobel

Research in Economics, 2012, vol. 66, issue 4, 391-397

Abstract: Using a two-country general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents and uncertainty, we examine how countries' adoption of different fundamental approaches to taxing international capital income will affect portfolio choices and pricing relationships in international bond and foreign exchange markets. We characterize an equilibrium where (tax-)arbitrageurs in the country applying the source principle may exploit the resulting tax arbitrage opportunities up to some individual bound, normal investors in either country refrain, or are restrained, from constructing such (tax-)arbitrage portfolios, while arbitrageurs in the country using the residence principle do not share in any tax arbitrage profits.

Keywords: Tax arbitrage; Capital income taxation; Source; Residence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:66:y:2012:i:4:p:391-397

DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2012.07.003

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