On Stackelberg competition in strategic multilateral exchange

Ludovic Julien ()

Research in Economics, 2013, vol. 67, issue 1, 59-75

Abstract: In this paper, we consider a strategic equilibrium concept which extends Stackelberg competition to cover a general equilibrium framework. From the benchmark of strategic market games proposed by Sahi and Yao (1989), we define the notion of Stackelberg equilibrium. This concept captures strategic interactions in interrelated markets on which a finite number of leaders and followers compete on quantities. Within the framework of an example, convergence and welfare are studied. More specifically, we analyze convergence toward the competitive equilibrium and make welfare comparisons with other strategic equilibria.

Keywords: Stackelberg general equilibrium; Convergence; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090944312000397
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: On Stackelberg competition in strategic multilateral exchange (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:67:y:2013:i:1:p:59-75

DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2012.09.001

Access Statistics for this article

Research in Economics is currently edited by Federico Etro

More articles in Research in Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().