Coordination, timing and common knowledge
Stephen Morris ()
Research in Economics, 2014, vol. 68, issue 4, 306-314
There is tight link between coordination and common knowledge. The role of higher order beliefs in static incomplete information games has been widely studied. In particular, information frictions break down common knowledge. A large body of literature in economics examine dynamic coordination problems when there are timing frictions, in the sense that players do not all move at once. Timing frictions in dynamic coordination games play a role that is closely analogous to information frictions in static coordination games.
Keywords: Coordination; Common knowledge; Global game; Timing frictions; Calvo frictions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Coordination, Timing and Common Knowledge (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:68:y:2014:i:4:p:306-314
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