The transparency curse: Private information and political freedom

John B. Londregan

Research in Economics, 2015, vol. 69, issue 3, 412-438

Abstract: I offer a model of the sustainability of authoritarian rule in which the transparency of productive economic activity enables the ruler to distinguish productive economic activity from preparations for rebellion. The less transparent the productive technology the greater the economic side effects of maintaining authoritarian rule, and the stronger the incentives to liberalize the regime. Using a cross section of countries I provide evidence that, consistently with the theory, democratic government Granger causes internet penetration.

Keywords: Political economy; Transparency curse; Democracy; Dictatorship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 O30 O57 P16 P26 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:69:y:2015:i:3:p:412-438

DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2015.04.002

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