Resource harvesting regulation and enforcement: An evolutionary approach
Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos and
Anastasios Xepapadeas ()
Research in Economics, 2017, vol. 71, issue 2, 236-253
We study the evolution of compliance and regulation of a renewable common pool resource, a fishery in particular, with appropriators whose decision on whether to comply or not with harvesting quotas is the result of imitation described by a proportional rule. The regulator first sets the optimal quota and then harvesters can choose between compliance and violation. We investigate myopic regulation and optimal regulation regimes with a proportional fine and an endogenized probability of audit. The outcome of regulation is characterized in terms of monomorphic and polymorphic steady states with respect to compliance. Using numerical simulations stability properties are examined, and sensitivity analysis explores the effect of various parameters on polymorphic steady-state outcomes.
Keywords: Common pool resources; Replicator dynamics; Optimal regulation; Compliance; Monomorphic; Polymorphic steady states (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Working Paper: Resource Harvesting Regulation and Enforcement: An Evolutionary Approach (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:71:y:2017:i:2:p:236-253
Access Statistics for this article
Research in Economics is currently edited by Federico Etro
More articles in Research in Economics from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Dana Niculescu ().