Secure implementability under Pareto-efficient rules in linear production economies with classical preferences
Research in Economics, 2018, vol. 72, issue 3, 379-383
This paper studies secure implementability (Saijo et al. (2007) “Secure Implementation,” Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203–229) in linear production economies with classical preferences. Although secure implementability is in general stronger than the combination of strategy-proofness and non-bossiness (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) “Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points,” Review of Economic Studies 48, pp.587–597), this paper shows that both properties are equivalent under Pareto-efficient rules in the economies. In addition, this paper characterizes securely implementable and Pareto-efficient rules in the economies when the number of agents is two.
Keywords: Secure implementation; Dominant strategy implementation; Nash implementation; Strategy-proofness; Linear production economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D51 D52 D61 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:72:y:2018:i:3:p:379-383
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