Selection by committee: Anonymity and gratitude

Luigi Balletta and Salvatore Modica

Research in Economics, 2018, vol. 72, issue 4, 511-517

Abstract: What kind of candidate is selected into a job when the principal has to appoint a committee to measure the candidates’ ability and select a winner? We find that if the committee takes into account the candidate’s gratitude towards them, a candidate with less than first best ability will be selected. A relevant exception may occur if the first best is the overall best candidate. First best selection is always achieved if the committee is anonymous to the candidates. If the committee is not detached enough from the candidates then delegation fares even worse than random selection.

Keywords: Candidate selection; Expert appointment; Gratitude and reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:72:y:2018:i:4:p:511-517

DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2018.10.001

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