Permanent and temporary workers in a matching framework

Markus Gebauer

Research in Economics, 2019, vol. 73, issue 2, 138-148

Abstract: This paper investigates on a theoretical level the underlying causes of recent trends in decision of firms to hire temporary and permanent labour when workers and firms meet through a frictional directed search technology. Temporary workers differ from permanent workers in that they have a lower bargaining weight but look for a permanent job while on the temporary job. The findings are that permanent arrangements are more prevalent the more productive the aggregate production function is, i.e. also in the less productive phases. More efficient matching has an inverse U shaped impact, it first increases the prevalence of temporary arrangements and then decreases it. Bargaining weights have an ambiguous impact.

Keywords: Temporary and permanent positions; Matching function; Productivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:73:y:2019:i:2:p:138-148

DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2019.04.001

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