Competing for promotion: Are “THE BEST” always the best?

Matteo Migheli ()

Research in Economics, 2019, vol. 73, issue 2, 149-161

Abstract: Several selection processes use multistage tournaments to choose the best candidates. The theoretical models predict that tournaments are efficient in selecting the best candidates, as they stimulate the best to perform relatively better than their opponents. Empirical tests are difficult, as data on the agents involved in these selections are scarce. Exploiting data from field tournaments, the World Swimming Championships, I show that two- and three-stage tournaments are effective for stimulating performance and selecting the best contestants; results indicate that the winners are the players who are most able to increase their relative performance from one stage to the next.

Keywords: Tournament; Competition; Selection; Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D03 J33 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:73:y:2019:i:2:p:149-161

DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2019.04.002

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