Best-shot network games with continuous action space

Papiya Ghosh () and Rajendra Kundu

Research in Economics, 2019, vol. 73, issue 3, 225-234

Abstract: This paper presents a model of public good provision in networks where the level of public good that an agent has access to depends on the maximum of contributions by the agents in her neighbourhood. Our analysis shows that the game always has an equilibrium in pure strategies and all equilibria are specialised and stable. Welfare analysis shows that formation of new links in a prevailing network may not always be useful.

Keywords: Innovation; Network; Maximal independent set; Nash tatonnement; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D85 H41 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090944319301188
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:73:y:2019:i:3:p:225-234

DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2019.07.003

Access Statistics for this article

Research in Economics is currently edited by Federico Etro

More articles in Research in Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().