Garage and curbside parking competition with search congestion

Eren Inci and Charles Lindsey ()

Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2015, vol. 54, issue C, 49-59

Abstract: We consider a parking market with privately operated parking garages, publicly operated curbside parking, and drivers who differ in parking duration. In equilibrium, long-term and short-term parkers can allocate themselves to garages and curbside parking in various ways. The equilibrium is generally inefficient because garage operators exercise market power, and drivers have to search for curbside parking which creates a search cost externality. A city planner can achieve the social optimum without regulating garage prices if it can charge differentiated curbside parking fees. Many cities still have parking meters that can only levy uniform fees, and it is very costly to replace them. However, numerical results show that the efficiency loss due to uniform pricing is modest in most cases.

Keywords: Endogenous outside option; Parking; Price discrimination; Search costs; Spatial competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 L13 R41 R48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:regeco:v:54:y:2015:i:c:p:49-59

DOI: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2015.07.003

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