Institutional design, political competition and spillovers

Marco Alderighi and Christophe Feder

Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2020, vol. 81, issue C

Abstract: We establish a link between the best system of government and the strength of inter-state spillovers within a model of political competition with self-interested parties. We show the superiority of the unitary system when: inter-state spillovers are strong; the ego rents of local parties are high; and the system of government is chosen under a veil of ignorance.

Keywords: Institutional design; Voting; Self-interested politicians; Allocation of power; Federalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 H41 H70 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:regeco:v:81:y:2020:i:c:s0166046218302308

DOI: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2019.103505

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