Institutional design, political competition and spillovers
Marco Alderighi and
Christophe Feder ()
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2020, vol. 81, issue C
We establish a link between the best system of government and the strength of inter-state spillovers within a model of political competition with self-interested parties. We show the superiority of the unitary system when: inter-state spillovers are strong; the ego rents of local parties are high; and the system of government is chosen under a veil of ignorance.
Keywords: Institutional design; Voting; Self-interested politicians; Allocation of power; Federalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 D72 H41 H70 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:regeco:v:81:y:2020:i:c:s0166046218302308
Access Statistics for this article
Regional Science and Urban Economics is currently edited by D.P McMillen and Y. Zenou
More articles in Regional Science and Urban Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Haili He ().