Cost of electricity banking under open-access arrangement: A case of solar electricity in India
Sourabh Jain and
Nikunj Kumar Jain
Renewable Energy, 2020, vol. 146, issue C, 776-788
Installing 100 GW of solar capacity by 2022 is challenging as Indian distribution companies (DISCOMs) avoiding buying renewable electricity (RE) due to financial distress and generation overcapacity and large customers do not buy RE due to the intermittency. Thus, the provision of banking services by DISCOMs to open-access consumers (OACs) buying renewable electricity (RE) from independent generators can be alternative way to promote RE in India. However, banking services affect the merit order dispatch (MOD) schedule of DISCOMs and result in merit order effect (MOE). Based on the existing concept of MOE, the banking fee was calculated as the differences in cost of dispatch between in banking and without banking scenarios for DISCOMs of the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh for providing banking to a hypothetical customer willing to buy solar electricity under open access.
Keywords: Merit order dispatch; Solar electricity distribution; Open access consumer; Electricity banking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C22 Q41 Q42 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:renene:v:146:y:2020:i:c:p:776-788
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