Domestic environmental policy and international cooperation for global commons

Thierry Bréchet, Natali Hritonenko and Yuri Yatsenko

Resource and Energy Economics, 2016, vol. 44, issue C, 183-205

Abstract: The paper analyzes the strategic behavior of several countries engaged in capital accumulation, pollution mitigation, and environmental adaptation in the context of an environmental common good. Both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies are discussed. The non-cooperative strategy is a dynamic game in which each country makes its own environmental decision following the open-loop Nash equilibrium. The cooperative social planner problem assumes an international environmental agreement in force. The non-cooperative and cooperative solutions are compared in the symmetric case of two countries and extended to several identical countries. It is shown that the non-cooperative strategy in multi-country world leads to over-production, over-consumption, over-pollution, and over-adaptation.

Keywords: Climate policy; Adaptation; Mitigation; Social planner problem; Dynamic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0928765516000257
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Domesmtic environmental policy and international cooperation for global commons (2016)
Working Paper: Domestic environmental policy and international cooperation for global commons (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:resene:v:44:y:2016:i:c:p:183-205

DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2016.03.002

Access Statistics for this article

Resource and Energy Economics is currently edited by J. F. Shogren and S. Smulders

More articles in Resource and Energy Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().