Domestic environmental policy and international cooperation for global commons

Thierry Bréchet, Natali Hritonenko and Yuri Yatsenko
Additional contact information
Natali Hritonenko: Houston Baptist University, Texas, USA

No 2014045, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: The paper analyzes the strategic behavior of several countries engaged in capital accumulation, pollution mitigation, and environmental adaptation in the context of an environmental common good. Both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies are discussed. The non-cooperative strategy is a dynamic game in which each country makes its own environmental decision following the open-loop Nash equilibrium. The cooperative social planner problem assumes an international environmental agreement in force. The non-cooperative and cooperative solutions are compared in the symmetric case of two countries and extended to several identical countries. It is shown that the non- cooperative strategy in multi-country world leads to over-production, over-consumption, over-pollution, and over-adaptation.

Keywords: climate policy; adaptation; mitigation; dynamic general equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-11-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2014.html (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Domestic environmental policy and international cooperation for global commons (2016)
Working Paper: Domesmtic environmental policy and international cooperation for global commons (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2014045

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().