Why business schools do so much research: A signaling explanation
Damien Besancenot,
Joao Faria and
Radu Vranceanu
Research Policy, 2009, vol. 38, issue 7, 1093-1101
Abstract:
Criticism is mounting on business schools for their excessive focus on research and the relative neglect of teaching quality. This paper shows that if students have imperfect information about teaching quality and if business schools differ in their research productivity, the least productive schools would do as much research as the top-tier ones only to manipulate students' expectations. In turn, the most productive schools might resort to excess research in order to signal their type in the eyes of prospective students. Since resources are limited, they also tend to neglect teaching quality. Such a situation is socially inefficient as compared to the perfect information case.
Keywords: Business; schools; Research; management; Research; policy; Research; vs.; teaching; Signaling; Imperfect; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Why Business Schools Do So Much Research: A Signaling Explanation (2008) 
Working Paper: WHY BUSINESS SCHOOLS DO SO MUCH RESEARCH: A SIGNALING EXPLANATION (2008) 
Working Paper: WHY BUSINESS SCHOOLS DO SO MUCH RESEARCH: A SIGNALING EXPLANATION (2008) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:respol:v:38:y:2009:i:7:p:1093-1101
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