 Staggered boards and product innovations: Evidence from Massachusetts State Bill HB 5640I-Ju Chen, Po-Hsuan Hsu and Yanzhi Wang Research Policy, 2022, vol. 51, issue 4 Abstract: In this paper, we empirically investigate how staggered boards, a prevailing governance structure of high-tech firms, influence firms’ product innovations in the United States. We explore a quasi-natural experiment of a legislation change in Massachusetts that forced the adoption of staggered boards in 1990 for the causal effect of staggered boards. We find that, when compared with firms in other states, Massachusetts-incorporated firms without staggered boards before 1990 perform better with respect to product innovations once they adopt staggered boards after 1990. The positive effect of staggered boards on product innovations is stronger for firms with higher takeover vulnerability, with higher institutional ownership, and in industries with higher advertising expenditures. Such a positive effect is consistent with staggered boards’ long-term orientation and is further confirmed by treated firms’ better product quality after 1990. Keywords: Staggered board; Product innovations; Trademarks; Product patents; Massachusetts (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:respol:v:51:y:2022:i:4:s0048733322000038 DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2022.104475 Access Statistics for this article Research Policy is currently edited by M. Bell, B. Martin, W.E. Steinmueller, A. Arora, M. Callon, M. Kenney, S. Kuhlmann, Keun Lee and F. Murray More articles in Research Policy from Elsevier |
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