Mergers and capital flight in unionised oligopolies: Is there scope for a "national champion" policy?

Kjell Lommerud (), Frode Meland and Odd Rune Straume

International Review of Economics & Finance, 2011, vol. 20, issue 2, 325-341

Abstract: Many policy makers seem to prefer domestic alternatives to cross-border mergers. We construct a model where cross-border mergers drive down union-set wages, domestic mergers have non-labour cost synergies and policy evaluators care more about workers than capital owners. Apparently, the stage is set for "national champion" policies to be sensible. However, we also introduce the possibility of capital flight by allowing a domestic firm to move production abroad. Restrictive cross-border merger policies can then seriously backfire, since they do not necessarily bring about a domestic merger -- but capital flight instead.

Keywords: Cross-border; merger; National; champions; Greenfield; FDI; Trade; unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Mergers and capital flight in unionised oligopolies: Is there scope for a 'national champion' policy? (2008)
Working Paper: Mergers and capital flight in unionised oligopolies: Is there scope for a 'national champion' policy? (2008)
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