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An optimal government spending reversal rule in a small open economy

Shigeto Kitano and Kenya Takaku

International Review of Economics & Finance, 2013, vol. 27, issue C, 374-382

Abstract: This paper presents a reexamination of debt stabilization policy in a small open economy borrowing from abroad. Spending reversals are incorporated as a policy option available to policy-makers for stabilizing public debt. Results show that a spending reversal rule can be welfare-improving and that there exists an optimal degree of spending reversal. An optimal spending reversal rule can lower both the tax rate volatility and interest rate volatility compared with the case without the reversal rule. Results also suggest that, as friction in foreign borrowing becomes greater (because of a higher country-specific interest rate premium), the welfare benefit of the reversal rule will be increasingly important.

Keywords: Sovereign debt; Debt stabilization; Welfare; Spending reversals; Spain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:27:y:2013:i:c:p:374-382

DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2012.11.003

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