Technology licensing in a differentiated oligopoly

Aniruddha Bagchi and Arijit Mukherjee

International Review of Economics & Finance, 2014, vol. 29, issue C, 455-465

Abstract: We show the effects of product differentiation and product market competition on technology licensing by an outside innovator. For a certain range of product differentiation, both the innovator and the society prefer royalty licensing compared to auction (or fixed-fee), irrespective of Cournot and Bertrand competitions, if the number of potential licensees is sufficiently large. Hence, for such a range of product differentiation, neither the innovator nor the antitrust authority requires information about the type of product market competition in choosing the type of the licensing contract.

Keywords: Auction; Licensing; Royalty; Product differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Technology licensing in a differentiated oligopoly (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:29:y:2014:i:c:p:455-465

DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2013.07.005

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