Going private transactions by U.S.-Listed Chinese companies: What drives the premiums paid?
Yea-Mow Chen,
Ying Sophie Huang,
David K. Wang and
Chun-Chou Wu
International Review of Economics & Finance, 2014, vol. 32, issue C, 79-91
Abstract:
This paper examines the premiums paid by U.S.-listed Chinese companies in going-private transactions over the period from 2010 to 2012 and tests several incentive hypotheses for taking public companies private. Apart from the factors representing perceived difficulties and potential litigation risks in buying back shares, and corporate governance and agency issues, we focus our attention on the undervaluation of share prices and the amount of cash holdings of the sample firms. The latter two factors turn out to be the primary drivers of the premiums paid. Our empirical evidence strongly suggests that the current phase of going-private transactions by U.S.-listed Chinese firms is most likely to be linked to arbitrage considerations, i.e., to arbitrage the undervalued share prices and the cash holdings available to the acquirers.
Keywords: Firm undervaluation; Corporate governance; Going private (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 K22 M40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1059056014000094
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:32:y:2014:i:c:p:79-91
DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2014.01.008
Access Statistics for this article
International Review of Economics & Finance is currently edited by H. Beladi and C. Chen
More articles in International Review of Economics & Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().