Pay for accounting performance and R&D investment: Evidence from China

Shenglan Chen, Bingxuan Lin, Rui Lu and Hui Ma

International Review of Economics & Finance, 2016, vol. 44, issue C, 142-153

Abstract: Previous studies argue that due to the complexity and long-term nature of research and development (R&D), there is no significant relationship between pay for short-term accounting performance and R&D investment. Meanwhile, we might also expect a negative relationship between pay for accounting performance and R&D investment in firms under temporary earnings pressure. However, we show that in an emerging market such as China, where the agency cost of innovation is high, firms may use incentive plans based on accounting performance to mitigate the opportunistic behavior of management. We find a positive relationship between pay for accounting performance and R&D investment. In addition, we find that the above relationship becomes weaker if there are alternative governance mechanisms to mitigate the agency cost of innovation.

Keywords: Pay for accounting performance; Compensation; Innovation; Agency; Chinese market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:44:y:2016:i:c:p:142-153

DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2016.04.004

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