The effects of affiliations on the initial public offering pricing
Camilla Mazzoli and
International Review of Economics & Finance, 2017, vol. 51, issue C, 295-313
This paper studies the impact of affiliations between lead managers, venture capitalists, and institutional investors on the Initial Public Offering (IPO) pricing. Using a sample of 1996 US IPOs issued between 1997 and 2010, we find that affiliations strongly and positively affect the offer price by improving the information production process. We also show that the underpricing is affected by affiliations because of conflicts of interest that exist between the players: when an institutional investor is affiliated with a lead manager or with a venture capitalist we observe nepotistic behavior in hot IPOs and dumping ground behavior in cold IPOs.
Keywords: Initial public offerings; Conflicts of interest; Underpricing; Information asymmetries; Price adjustment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G24 G31 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:51:y:2017:i:c:p:295-313
Access Statistics for this article
International Review of Economics & Finance is currently edited by H. Beladi and C. Chen
More articles in International Review of Economics & Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().