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Does equalization transfer enhance partial tax cooperation?

Wenming Wang, Keisuke Kawachi and Hikaru Ogawa

International Review of Economics & Finance, 2017, vol. 51, issue C, 431-443

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect of equalization transfer scheme on partial tax cooperation condition in a repeated game setting. It is shown that in order to achieve partial tax cooperation between two capital-rich (exporting) countries, the full equalization transfer scheme is superior to the partial equalization transfer scheme, whereas in order to achieve partial tax cooperation between two capital-poor (importing) countries, the partial equalization transfer scheme is superior to the full equalization transfer scheme.

Keywords: Partial tax cooperation; Full equalization transfer; Partial equalization transfer; Repeated game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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