Moral hazard, skin in the game regulation and CRA performance

Saltuk Ozerturk

International Review of Economics & Finance, 2017, vol. 52, issue C, 147-164

Abstract: This paper investigates the implications of the “issuer skin in the game” regulation for the rating accuracy of a credit rating agency (CRA). The analysis shows that, as well mitigating a moral hazard problem on the issuer's side, skin in the game requirements can also improve the rating accuracy of a CRA involved in the sale. The results also link the accuracy of the CRA's ratings to the severity of the issuer's moral hazard problem. A more nuanced skin in the game rule that accounts for the specifics of the underlying security class can be more desirable rather than the proposed ”one size fits all” rule.

Keywords: Credit rating agencies; Skin in the game; Rating accuracy; Moral hazard; Financial regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 G24 G28 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1059056017307323
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:52:y:2017:i:c:p:147-164

DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2017.10.006

Access Statistics for this article

International Review of Economics & Finance is currently edited by H. Beladi and C. Chen

More articles in International Review of Economics & Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().