Punching out of one's weight class? Cross agreement retaliation in the WTO
James C. Hartigan
International Review of Economics & Finance, 2018, vol. 54, issue C, 274-288
Agreements are expressed in terms of the level of standards, which serves as a proxy for the degree of permitted discretion. A pair of sub-agreements constitutes the treaty. The extent to which preferences of governments entail cross agreement linkages in negotiation are presented. The model is applied to the WTO's DSU, revealing that it contributes to performance of the agreement when a regime is elected desiring weaker commitments. When cross agreement retaliation is more effective than within agreement retaliation is disclosed. This does not depend upon power disparities of the signatories, although implications for the achievement of negotiations may exist. This template helps you to create a properly formatted manuscript.
Keywords: WTO trade agreements; Cross agreement retaliation; Standards; Power disparities; Dispute settlement understanding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:54:y:2018:i:c:p:274-288
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