Does the debt tax shield distort ownership efficiency?

Pehr-Johan Norbäck, Lars Persson and Joacim Tåg

International Review of Economics & Finance, 2018, vol. 54, issue C, 299-310

Abstract: The tax laws of most developed countries are debt biased since firms can deduct interest on debt but not on equity. This bias is known to distort investment decisions. However, less is known about how the debt tax shield affects the ownership of assets when bidders differ financial expertise and thus in optimal use of leverage. We show that the debt tax shield need not always distort ownership efficiency. Assets end up with the socially preferred owner when differences in financial and productive expertise between bidders is small and better financial expertise reduces expected bankruptcy costs.

Keywords: Acquisitions; Capital gains tax; Corporate tax; LBOs; M&As; Ownership; Private equity; Tax shields (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D20 G32 G33 G34 H25 H32 L19 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Does the Debt Tax Shield Distort Ownership Efficiency? (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:54:y:2018:i:c:p:299-310

DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2017.09.012

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