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Regional distribution of college enrollment in China under a multiple-principal framework

Zhou Bihua

International Review of Economics & Finance, 2018, vol. 57, issue C, 122-133

Abstract: What factors affect the regional distribution of college enrollment in China? This paper establishes a simple theoretical model under a multiple-principal framework and verifies that local college enrollment is affected by factors such as the principals involved, the educational quality, the availability and type of incentives, and policy constraints. The results show that principals adopt different incentive strategies, including “performance purchase” and “cost support”. In addition, local government fiscal incentives can increase local enrollment. Among affiliated colleges, those with higher educational quality have higher local enrollment; among local colleges, those with higher educational quality have lower local enrollment.

Keywords: Multiple principals; Incentive intensity; College enrollment; Common agency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I24 I28 I23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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