 The impact of Japan’s stewardship code on shareholder votingYasutomo Tsukioka International Review of Economics & Finance, 2020, vol. 67, issue C, 148-162 Abstract: This study investigates the impact of Japan’s Stewardship Code on the shareholder voting behavior of institutional investors. The stewardship code is not mandatory with legally binding regulations, but it encourages institutional investors to exercise their voting rights and monitor their investee firms to improve their investee firm value. I find that Japan’s Stewardship Code leads trust banks and insurance companies that accept the code and do not lend money to their investee firms to become more likely to vote against the appointment of representative directors and CEOs in firms with lower profitability. Furthermore, after the code, pension funds and foreign shareholders become more likely to vote against the appointment of representative directors and CEO appointments in firms with lower profitability. These results suggest that Japan’s Stewardship Code promotes voting activities of institutional investors. Keywords: Corporate governance; Stewardship code; Voting; Shareholder meeting; Institutional ownership; Cross-shareholding (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:67:y:2020:i:c:p:148-162 DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2019.12.014 Access Statistics for this article International Review of Economics & Finance is currently edited by H. Beladi and C. Chen More articles in International Review of Economics & Finance from Elsevier |
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