Trade liberalization and incentives to implement antidumping protection

Hiroshi Mukunoki

International Review of Economics & Finance, 2021, vol. 72, issue C, 422-437

Abstract: Reducing trade costs by reducing tariffs can be overturned if the tariff reductions induce governments to implement antidumping (AD) measures. Some empirical studies show that a commitment to reduce tariffs leads to more frequent use of AD protection. Other studies show that we rarely observe this substitution effect between tariffs and AD actions. This study theoretically explores the conditions under which a lower import tariff promotes AD actions. Results suggest that a lower tariff encourages AD actions in countries with a small market size. However, it can either encourage or discourage AD actions of countries with a large market size.

Keywords: Trade liberalization; Antidumping; International oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:72:y:2021:i:c:p:422-437

DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2020.11.015

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